I formulate a rational expectations signaling model of vicarious liability for securities fraud, particularly the much-criticized "fraud on the market" private class action arising under Rule 10b-5. I show that fraudulent misreporting by managers occurs in the absence of managerial moral hazard -i.e., where managers simply maximize shareholder payo¤s -and that vicarious liability can serve as an appropriate deterrent, creating separating equilibrium. I then show that the particular remedy under Rule 10b-5 can perfectly deter fraud and perfectly compensate purchasers, and that, therefore, many of the current criticisms of Rule 10b-5 class actions are ill-founded.
Introduction
Under the American system of securities regulation, the chief anti-fraud enforcement mechanism is the private class action arising under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (also known as the "fraud on the market" class action). Liability for securities fraud is vicarious, as it is the …rm and not the bad actor (ostensibly management) that bears the cost of the remedy under the fraud on the market action. Since shareholders of the …rm at the time of the fraud suit are the ones who ultimately bear these costs, the fraud on the market remedy has a curious property in terms of who is punished: it neither punishes the persons who bene…t from the fraud (selling shareholders and possibly managers), nor the natural persons who committed the fraud (management), but instead the rule punishes those trusting shareholders who held their shares through thick and thin. What is worse, purchasers of the …rm's shares, who were duped by the fraud, must also participate in funding the …rm's liability since they are now holders of shares. This scandalous quality has, especially of late, provoked considerable outrage among legal scholars who claim, variously, that fraud on the market fails at deterrence, fails at compensation, amounts to the plainti¤s suing themselves, severely overpunishes relative to the harm caused, and, in a triumph of unfairness, lets the bad guys -managers -o¤ scot free. 1 Unfortunately, as I show in this paper, these criticisms are not well-founded. I …rst show, using a signaling model of a manager's decision to disclose his private information to the market, that fraud occurs even where -in fact, becausethe manager maximizes current shareholders' aggregate welfare with sel ‡ess abandon. 2 This is because current shareholders are always going to be net sellers of the …rm's shares in aggregate; hence the manager who maximizes aggregate shareholder welfare will prefer, ceteris paribus, to falsely in ‡ate the trading price of the …rm's shares. Put another way, the most fundamental conceit of the anti-vicarious liability critics -that fraud must be the product of managerial agency costs -is incorrect. Shareholders themselves might prefer "bad" corporate governance that causes managers to in ‡ate …rm value.
I next show that, given this incentive for the manager to commit fraud, there exists some level of vicarious liability that is perfectly deterrent (i.e., that neither over-nor under-deters) so long as not all shareholders sell their shares during the period of fraudulent price in ‡ation. This is so because the manager maximizes aggregate shareholder payo¤s, and since so long as the punishment reaches at least one shareholder, the enforcer can make threatened penalties arbitrarily large until the expected penalty balances out against the gain from fraud. 3 I then turn to the properties of the particular form of vicarious liability that we have under Rule 10b-5 class actions. I begin by showing that Rule 10b-5 remedies are, when awarded, always perfectly compensatory in the sense that purchasers' net payo¤ is always zero. 4 This is true even though the expected penalty feeds back into stock price declines, such that the total price decline is greater than the shortfall in the …rm's cash ‡ows, and even though purchasers must participate in funding their own recovery. Additionally, I show that the 10b-5 remedy remains perfectly compensatory even where there are foreseeable costs of litigation that are borne by the …rm; costs borne by the plainti¤ (such as plainti¤s'attorneys'fees) do, however, make the remedy under-compensatory.
I next consider how the 10b-5 mechanism functions depending upon what information is veri…able in court. Perhaps most surprisingly, I show that the 10b-5 remedy is perfectly deterrent and compensatory in the case where the court can observe nothing except stock prices, and imposes liability for any stock price decline, whether or not fraudulent. The reason is that a rescissionary measure (which 10b-5 essentially is) is perfectly deterrent when always imposed in the event of fraud, and given an inability to detect fraud, courts can deter fraud only by imposing the penalty always. I also show that the compensatory nature of the remedy is necessary to preserving fraud deterrence; in a regime where, say, the government keeps the fraud penalties, fraud is never deterred. The reason is that, when the compensatory element is removed, ex ante prices fall, which means that the low type …rm now has more to gain from mimicking the high type of …rm.
In the case where the court has some information about whether fraud was committed, and imposes fraud sanctions only where it is more likely than not that fraud occurred, deterrence is less than complete in that …rms of low quality employ a mixed strategy of sometimes lying and sometimes not. Finally, I show that where courts are omniscient, 10b-5 is again perfectly deterrent and compensatory.
These …ndings have important implications for current proposals for securities litigation reform. First of all, the current focus on increasing sanctions on managers (as recent legislation such as Sarbanes Oxley has already done) is misplaced; fraud can arise from shareholder incentives. Second, centrally administered sanctions require that the government possesses a great deal of information about the …rm in order to avoid over-or under-deterrence, which is almost certainly not true. In contrast, current remedies under 10b-5 are market-driven and, to a great extent, automatically adjust to preserve deterrence even where courts are highly incompetent. Third, I show that it is not necessarily evidence of a broken securities fraud regime that there is a substantial incidence of litigation or that litigation follows largely or even solely on price declines; indeed, securities litigation may be endemic where there is substantial or even complete deterrence. Finally, one should be concerned generally with the current reform proposals, since the criticisms in the legal literature on which those proposals are based are themselves ill-founded.
While all this is not to say that 10b-5 is not without its problems -indeed, it is hard to justify economically the need for a mandatory disclosure regime at all! -or that other liability mechanisms might be just as suitable or even better, 5 this paper presents at least a …rst step toward a proper economic evaluation of securities antifraud mechanisms. Perhaps as a matter of political economy, we are stuck with some system of mandatory disclosure and non-disclaimable securities fraud law; one should bear in mind that the status quo is not as bad as things might get, particularly in light of current reform proposals that amount to coercive federal corporate governance mandates enforced by threat of a lifetime in prison. Section 1.1 of this paper provides a brief refresher on the functioning of the fraud on the market rule; Section 1.2 brie ‡y surveys the major criticisms of the rule and notes how they appear to be winning the day in current legislative reform proposals. Section 2 speci…es a rational expectations signaling model where managers signal private information to the market. Section 3 states some results concerning incentives to commit fraud and the e¤ectiveness of vicarious liability. Section 4 then considers the functioning of 10b-5 liability based on di¤erent speci…cations of what the court can observe. Section 5 brie ‡y concludes and outlines directions for future research.
A mini-review of 10b-5 fraud on the market
Rule 10b-5 and Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 make actionable material misstatements or omissions in the sale or purchase of securities, with a private right of action granted to investors by the Supreme Court in 1971 in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. Subsequent developments of legal doctrine allow multiple plainti¤ claims to be aggregated into class actions, and, as implemented in the Supreme Court case of Basic v. Levinson in 1988, the e¢ cient capital markets hypothesis creates a market test for the non-scienter elements of fraud (causation, reliance, materiality, and damages). 6 This market test is whether a change in stock price occurred at the time that information reached the market that corrected the misstatement or omission. 7 That is, making out a 10b-5 fraud on the market class action is largely a matter of conducting an event study on stock price movement around the time that the market learned of the fraud. Damages for each plainti¤ are then the price drop of the corrective disclosure multiplied by the plainti¤'s net change in position from the moment just before the fraud was committed to the moment just after the corrective disclosure occurred (this period is known as the "e¤ective period" of the fraud).
An example will help to clarify to the operation of the rule. Suppose that at time 0, the …rm's shares are trading at $7. At time 1, the …rm makes a disclosure to the market, and the …rm's stock price rises to $10. At time 2, it is revealed to the market that the …rm's disclosure at time 1 was false, and the …rm's stock price drops to $6. If an investor's holding of stock at just before time 1 was 50 shares, and her holding of stock at just after time 2 is 75 shares, the investor would be entitled to recover damages of $4 on each of 25 shares, for a total recovery of $100. One can imagine more complicated scenarios where multiple frauds or corrective disclosures occur, but the basic story remains the same. 6 Scienter requires that the …rm or its agents made the statement with the requisite intent to defraud (i.e., that they knew that the statement was untrue at the time of its making), although often-times in the corporate context this is more akin to a negligence standard since some agent of the …rm generally knows of the misstatement, though not necessarily whether the misstatement is material. 7 Prior to the Supreme Court's Dura Pharmaceuticals decision of 2005, a plainti¤ could make out a fraud on the market clasim with merely fraudulent price in ‡ation, without having to show a stock price drop at the time of corrective disclosure. Dura appears to have made ex post declines a necessary element of a fraud on the market claim. See Spindler (2007b).
Prior literature: criticisms of fraud on the market
The literature on 10b-5 fraud on the market has not been kind. More or less every aspect of the fraud on the market mechanism has been impugned in some way: the compensatory function; the deterrent function; the actual calculation of damages; the adjudicative accuracy or "merits" of the lawsuits that are brought; the high transaction costs entailed; whether the targeted activity of secondary market fraud is actually harmful -all this has been widely questioned over the past decade or so in a vibrant legal literature written by some of the best and most prominent securities scholars in the nation. 8 In this subsection, I describe these arguments in brief.
Several scholars have taken up the increasingly popular position that the fraud on the market rule is not a proper deterrent, since it punishes innocent shareholders instead of the culpable executives who commit the acts of fraud. Critics of vicarious liability (Arlen and Carney 1992; Co¤ee 2006) have made the point that to the extent that managers bene…t from fraud while shareholders do not, punishing the …rm collectively is not helpful. An important line of argument advanced initially by Arlen points out that vicarious liability may in fact deter the …rm from attempting to root out fraudsters for fear of civil liability (Arlen 1994; Arlen and Kraakman, 1997) . While these commentators generally support private market solutions for combating fraud and other malfeasance (i.e., letting …rms work things out themselves by scaling back fraud on the market liability), others have extended this argument to conclude that fraud is a result solely of managerial agency, and to call for increased public enforcement against executives (Alexander, 1996; Langevoort, 2007; Grundfest 2007) .
The most fundamental criticism of the compensatory function of the fraud on the market mechanism is the argument that diversi…ed investors do not bene…t from securities liability on the premise that losses from fraud are diversi…able risk (Alexander, 1996 The reasoning is that since a trader is just as likely to be on the winning side of a fraudulent transaction as the losing side, gains and losses ought to even out with a large number of trades. If that reasoning holds, then 10b-5 liability simply shifts money from one pocket of the investor to another, minus transaction costs. 9 This argument has led some to propose capping damages (Langevoort, 1996 at 642), having fraud …nes collected by the SEC instead of private plainti¤s (e.g., Alexander, 1996) , or moving instead to other forms of punitive public sanctions (e.g., Langevoort, 2007 at 633).
Another issue regarding compensation is that of the transactions costs involved in securities class actions (Alexander 1996 ; Co¤ee 2005 at 14-15; Co¤ee 2007; Grundfest 2007). Lawyers'fees, including plainti¤s'lawyers'cut of any award or settlement, are a signi…cant portion of any transfer between the …rm and plainti¤s, and other costs such as distraction of management may be significantly higher. Private class actions are thought by some to exacerbate these costs, and that everyone (except perhaps for plainti¤s'lawyers) could be made better o¤ by switching to a regime of public enforcement. Co¤ee (2007 at [16] [17] [18] [19] suggests that total litigation costs could actually exceed plainti¤ litigation recoveries.
There is then the question of whether, even if 10b-5 class actions would serve compensatory or deterrent functions given proper implementation, the mechanism implementing the recovery rule is somehow broken. A rather welldeveloped line of literature questions the merits of securities litigation (Alexander 1991; Bohn and Choi 1996; Perino 2003; Choi 2004 ), generally based upon empirical studies that have tried unsuccessfully to correlate incidence of securities settlements with some objective criteria of fraudulent behavior. Rather, litigation appears to follow almost inevitably on the heels of large share price declines, which has led some to decry 10b-5 as a scheme of "insurance" for investors who don't need it (Co¤ee, 2005 at 5) .
A somewhat smaller line of literature questions whether the damages remedies a¤orded under 10b-5 class actions are correct. First, taking the pocketshifting argument as a starting point, some scholars have argued that the 10b-5 measure of damages does not correspond to the social harm caused by secondary market fraud (Easterbrook and Fischel 1985 , Mahoney 1996 , Langevoort, 1996 . That is, if a diversi…ed trader simply diversi…es away secondary market fraud risk, there is not necessarily an e¢ ciency loss from that fraud. Alternatively, if trading losses are reimbursed under 10b-5, there is little incentive to invest in information gathering.
The second remedies criticism is that the 10b-5 measure of damages overcompensates plainti¤s (or at least overpunishes defendants) due to feedback e¤ects, since prospective liability is itself bad news which lowers share price and thereby further increases the amount of prospective liability (this thesis is most strongly stated by Alexander 1994 and Booth 2007 ; with earlier but more agnostic statements by Easterbrook and Fischel 1985 at 638-9; Arlen and Carney 1992). If that is the case, then 10b-5 might be overdeterrent by construction, and hence chill useful disclosure of …rm information. Alexander (1994) goes even further, claiming that 10b-5 damages are systemically overstated because share price declines incorporate not just the corrected information regarding the …rm's cash ‡ows, but also a "litigation put" (a positive value associated with the plainti¤s'right to recover their investment in some cases).
Taking some combination of these criticisms together, one can formulate any number of proposals for reform that would, on those terms, appear superior to private securities litigation. Alexander (1996) , for instance, argues for a schedule of SEC administrative …nes instead of private class actions. Langevoort (1996) , …nding 10b-5 overdeterrent and encouraging meritless suits, proposes a cap on damages against …rms. Co¤ee (2005) and Mahoney (1996) favor strengthening pleading requirements to cut back on the incidence of suit. Grundfest (2007) prefers federal sanctions on individual executives, including jail terms, and Langevoort (2007) proposes mechanisms to leave malfeasant ex-ecutives penniless. This is but a smattering of the various proposals that have surfaced in recent scholarship.
In any event, the critics seem to have been rather e¤ective. The past two decades have seen a cutting-back of 10b-5, with reforms such as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (which together tighten class and pleading requirements and in some cases limit damages) and Supreme Court decisions such as Dura Pharmaceuticals and Tellabs that have eroded the private right of action against the …rm by increasing evidentiary burdens. At the same time, there has been a growing trend toward public enforcement, as well as non-indemni…able liability risk for individual agents of the corporation. Among other things, Sarbanes Oxley provides for SEC collection of penalties, mandates particular governance structures such as board composition and relationships with auditors, imposes enhanced reporting and certi…cation responsibilities for managers, beefs up extant regulators and creates new ones (such as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board), and imposes up to 25 year jail terms on managers for even minor reporting or …duciary violations that need not have a material e¤ect upon the …rm's operations or share price. And many in ‡uential commentators are pushing for yet more along these lines; for example, in this spirit, a recent open letter from six prominent securities law professors to the SEC voiced several of these criticisms and urged further private securities litigation reforms ). And the Paulson Committee Report (2006) also prominently recommends cutting back on private securities litigation for the sake of US capital markets' competitiveness, and repeats the pocket-shifting, deterrence, and transaction costs arguments.
The model: a simple signaling game without agency costs
In this Section, I formulate a model of vicarious liability for securities fraud (and, in particular, the fraud on the market rule) in a simple game where managers act altruistically with regard to the current shareholders of the …rm. This setup is meant to show explicitly how incentives for fraud exist, and how vicarious liability may help preserve truthful signaling, in a context where the manager maximizes shareholder welfare. The way the model works is the following. In period 1, the …rm owns a risky project, about which the manager receives a private but noisy signal. The manager can then reveal this signal to the market, or he can lie about it (for instance, disclosing a high value when the true signal was low). The manager discloses so as to maximize aggregate shareholder payo¤s. Shareholders then make a decision to either hold their shares or sell them at the prevailing market price. All shares sold are bought by new investors in a competitive and rational capital market. In period 2, after the sale occurs, the …rm realizes cash ‡ows, and liability is assessed depending upon the level of cash ‡ows as well as other factors (I consider various speci…cations of how and when liability might be assessed in Section 4). Liability, if any, is assessed against the …rm, and transferred to the purchasers. Based upon the expected liability, the economy …nds an equilibrium where the manager's disclosure is credible (a separating equilibrium) or non-credible (a pooling equilibrium).
The economy
The economy in this model consists of a …rm that owns a project, a manager, N shareholders who each own one of the …rm's shares, a continuum of potential purchasers, and a liability mechanism that transfers wealth between the …rm and purchasers.
The …rm
At the start of period 1, the …rm has N shares outstanding, which are owned by N shareholders. The …rm owns a non-risky asset that is worth a constant ! per share (normalized to zero) 10 and a risky project that produces cash ‡ows of v in period 2. Cash ‡ows v are distributed uniformly on the interval [0, ], where is either H (high) or L (low), H > L. The probabilities of = H and = L are common knowledge, and are denoted as Pr(H) and Pr(L), where Pr(L) = 1 Pr(H): Penalties assessed against the …rm are paid pro-rata by persons who own shares at the time the penalty is assessed in period 2 (i.e., shareholders who have sold in period 1 do not participate in funding the liability, but purchasers who bought in period 1 do). Liability per share assessed against the …rm is denoted as l; total liability is N l.
Shareholders
Shareholders are risk-neutral investors; hence, utilities are written simply as payo¤s. Each of the shareholders owns 1 share of the …rm. In period 1, each shareholder can choose to either sell or hold her share. (The analysis is unchanged if shareholders are allowed to purchase additional shares, as I show in Appendix A). Shareholders who do not sell (henceforth, "non-selling shareholders") receive an expected payo¤ of
, where v is the cash ‡ow per share, l is the measure of damages per share assessed under the fraud liability rule, and is a function that determines whether fraud liability measure is imposed. 11 Selling shareholders ("selling shareholders") receive the payo¤ of U Si = p c i , where p is the trading price of the …rm's shares after the manager's disclosure and c i is the particular shareholder's cost of liquidating the share. The cost c i may represent foregone returns, tax, transactions fees, or other costs of selling or of not holding the share; c i may also be negative (for instance, if the shareholder has an immediate need for cash). What these costs do is to create a degree of heterogeneity among shareholders, which allows for trading among investors and the distinction between, say, long and short term investors.
I assume that the distribution of c i is common knowledge; shareholders realize their particular values c i after the manager's disclosure but before making the decision of whether to sell. A shareholder will therefore choose to sell her
The fraction of shareholders who choose to sell their shares in period 1 is denoted as .
The manager
In period 1, the manager receives a private signal , which may be either H or L; since v is distributed uniformly on [0; ], the manager's signal has predictive power. The manager then makes a disclosure 0 , which may be either truthful
12 In making his disclosure decision, the manager acts altruistically to maximize the sum of shareholders'ex post payo¤s, which, incidentally, means ignoring the interests of future purchasers. 13 He thus takes into account the proportion of shareholders who sell and who receive p E[c i ], and the proportion 1 who do not sell and who receive E[v l]: The manager's objective function is thus
where p, l, and are each functions of the manager's signal.
Purchasers
Purchasers are risk-neutral agents who can purchase 1 share of the …rm's stock in period 1. In period 2, if the liability mechanism operates, each purchaser receives a transfer t, which represents her share of the fraud remedy. However, since each purchaser now owns a share of the …rm, the purchaser also participates in funding the liability award; that is, each purchaser has her payo¤ reduced by l in the event of liability.
14 Purchasers draw inferences from the manager's signal under the particular liability regime, and break even in expectation given the manager's disclosure 1 2 Henceforth for convenience I will denote high and low signals by H 0 and L 0 respectively. 1 3 This assumption is equivalent to letting shareholders write a complete but unobservable contract with the manager. In either case, shareholders (or the manager) are unable to commit to not behaving opportunistically. Whether this is realistic is dubious given the resourcefulness of the market, but it is the assumption under which proponents of mandatory disclosure proceed.
On the issue of con ‡icts between present and future stakeholders, Greenwald and Stigler (1991) and Schwarcz (2005) provide earlier treatments. 1 4 This is what is commonly referred to as the circularity of 10b-5 damages or "pocketshifting," since purchasers both receive transfers and fund payment of 10b-5 liability.
(that is, the market e¢ ciently prices the share given the available information). I will call this break-even condition the purchaser's individual rationality constraint (IR P ) which is expressed formally as:
The variable t is the transfer to the purchaser; l is the liability per share; and is the "adjudication function" (described immediately below) which equals 1 if the …rm is found liable, and zero if not. The term is the purchaser's subjective probability of the …rm's being of type H given the manager's signal. For instance, in the case where the manager's signal perfectly identi…es the type of …rm (i.e., separating equilibrium), 2 f0; 1g. In the case where the manager's signal is non-credible (i.e., pooling equilibrium), the purchaser derives no new information from the signal and = Pr(H).
The liability mechanism
In period 2, the …rm realizes cash ‡ows v per share from the risky project. Under the fraud on the market cause of action, purchasers can make out a claim for damages only where the price has fallen below the price at which they purchased. Damages under Rule 10b-5 are equal to the price the purchaser paid minus the price post-revelation of the fraud: p p 0 , where p is the purchase price, and p 0 denotes the post-revelation share price. For a plainti¤ purchaser, a fraud claim is only colorable where there has been a price decline, i.e., p p 0 > 0. 15 Even given a price decline, liability only operates where a court adjudges that fraud occurred. To capture the role of courts, I let be an "adjudication function" that equals 1 when the court imposes liability, and 0 when it does not. I capture the necessity of price declines for liability by letting = 0 whenever p p 0 0.
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For example, under a strict liability regime where the …rm is liable for any price decline, = 1 if p p 0 > 0; and 0 otherwise. We can express the post-revelation trading price p 0 , liability l; and transfer t ; in terms of the other variables of the model. First, note that the operation of damages under 10b-5 is to award to defrauded purchasers a transfer t from the …rm equal to the di¤erence between the purchase price and the share price after the fraud is revealed, p p 0 . Second, it must be the case that the transfer and the liability totals must balance (i.e., what the …rm pays, the purchasers receive). Finally, the price of the share once the fraud is revealed, p 0 ; adjusts 1 5 This is the de…nition of "economic loss" that the Supreme Court enunciated in Dura Pharmaceuticals. 1 6 Note that 10b-5 does allow damages from fraudulent price de ‡ation, as where the managers disclose falsely low value to be able to purchase stock for themselves on the cheap. I do not consider those cases here, in part because they do not occur as often as price in ‡ation, and because, when they do, it is under a di¤erent model of shareholder interaction than the instant one. For instance, Arlen and Carney (1992) report that only 8.7% of securities fraud on the market cases involve allegations of fraudulent price de ‡ation, and that a signi…cant portion of that 8.7% comprise management or controlling shareholder buyouts. While those are still important cases to consider, they are beyond the scope of this paper.
in an e¢ cient market to take into account the realized cash ‡ow net of the expected liability. We then have the following:
This allows us to formulate the following proposition regarding the compensatory nature of damages under the fraud on the market regime:
When the speci…c remedy of 10b-5 liability is assessed (i.e., t = p p 0 ; l = t), purchasers are made just as well o¤ , and no better, than they were at the time of the purchase. This occurs even though "feedback e¤ ects" make the price decline upon the revelation of fraud (p p 0 ) exceed the di¤ erence between purchase price and resulting cash- ‡ows (p v).
To show this, one starts by combining the identities of (2) and rearranging:
Hence, the liability per share exceeds the shortfall of cash ‡ows versus purchase price by a factor of =(1 ): 17 Transfers per purchaser are higher than liability per share since the number of purchasers can never exceed the number of shares, such that t l, the purchaser's net recovery from 10b-5, must always be positive.
Solving for the post-revelation share price,
Note that the post-revelation share price is declining in p, and is decreasing in . From this, we can see that the decline in share price will exceed by a factor of (1 ) 1 the di¤erence between the disclosed price p and the project's realized cash ‡ows v -i.e., that there is indeed a "feedback e¤ect" as noted by Booth (2007) and others: p p 0 = (1 ) 1 (p v) However, one can show that this feedback e¤ect results in perfect compensation to the purchasers. In the event of 10b-5 liability, the purchaser receives a share of the …rm's cash ‡ows, funds the liability, receives the transfer, and pays the purchase price: U P = v l + t p: Substituting in, then, for l and t; one …nds that in the event of 10b-5 liability, the purchaser receives U P = 0: That is, the purchaser enjoys full ex post compensation.
It is worth a slight digression to illustrate what happens to ex post payo¤s where the …rm incurs costs from litigation.
Proposition 2 Foreseeable costs of litigation that are borne by the …rm do not a¤ ect the purchaser's full recovery.
To see this, suppose that litigation costs the …rm ", and that these costs are foreseeable once the …rm's fraud is revealed (i..e., it is known whether the …rm will ultimately be held liable or not by the court). The market takes these costs into account in valuing the share, and the post liability share price is p 0 = v l ". As before, the transfer is calculated by the court as t = p p 0 ; and liability l = t. Putting these together we get l = 1 (p v + "): The purchaser's net payo¤ with litigation costs is U P = v l "+t p. Substituting in for l and t; we see that U P = 0: That is, when the 10b-5 remedy is assessed, the remedy makes the defrauded purchaser whole ex post, inclusive of litigation costs borne by the …rm.
Plainti¤s'attorneys'fees as a function of the transfer t do, however, a¤ect purchaser compensation. Suppose that "(t) = " t; where " is some fraction between 0 and 1. That would mean that a plainti¤s'attorney takes the fraction " out of each transfer dollar each purchaser receives. In such a case, the purchaser's net payo¤ is
: One could, of course, …x this, if desired, by making …rms responsible for plainti¤s'attorneys' fees. As shown below in Section 4.1.1, where compensation is incomplete, deterrence is a¤ected.
Beliefs and the shareholder decision to sell
Shareholders choose to sell when the payo¤ from selling exceeds the expected payo¤ from holding the share. This depends, among other things, on the level of liquidation penalty the shareholder would incur from selling the share. Speci…cally, shareholder i will sell if U Si = p c i > U N = E[v l]: Thus, there exists some cut-o¤ threshold c above which shareholders choose to hold, and below which shareholders choose to sell. Rearranging, c = p E[v l]: The cut-o¤ c must always be greater than zero since the price p will take into account the right of recovery for purchasers of the share, such that p will exceed the expected value of the share's future cash ‡ows, E [v] . Substituting in for l, the cuto¤ is:
Note that the cuto¤ c is increasing in . This means that as the proportion of shareholders who sell increases, the cuto¤ below which one chooses to sell also increases. A shareholder's beliefs about what other shareholders believe in terms of selling behavior matters: if everyone else is going to sell, then the shareholder should sell, too, since being the last one holding the bag carries a very large penalty. 18 If = 1, then l = t, and separating equilibrium is un-sustainable (purchasers are merely suing themselves, so there is no longer any meaningful anti-fraud deterrent). For a separating equilibrium to result, there must not only be an adequate distribution of liquidation costs, but shareholders must have appropriate beliefs about the behavior of their fellow shareholders given that distribution. More speci…cally, for any level of ; there is a distribution of …nite liquidation costs c i that will support equilibrium if shareholders believe that is the actual level of shareholder selling. 19 On a di¤erent point, the distribution of c i may a¤ect the manager's decisionmaking: a higher price raises c ; which means that shareholders are going to incur more liquidation costs than they otherwise would (i.e., a higher price leads to more wasteful churning). This constitutes an additional incentive to the altruistic manager to disclose low. While this e¤ect may not be large, it signi…cantly complicates the math. I will therefore make a simplifying assumption on the distribution of c i ; namely, that if c i < c ; then c i 0.
Summary timeline
Summing up the above, the game proceeds in the following steps: 4. Price p is determined in a competitive capital market where purchasers break even in expectation. Purchasers purchase all shares o¤ered by selling shareholders.
5. Cash ‡ow v is publicly realized. 1 9 Suppose, for example, that = 1 and = 1. For measure .1 of shareholders, let c i = 0, while for measure .9; c i = :6. If beliefs are that = :1, then c 0:56; and, indeed, under these beliefs exactly .1 of shareholders would choose to sell. However, given that same distribution of c i ; shareholders could instead believe that = 1 ; in which case c = 1, and all shareholders choose to sell. Thus, both = :1 and = 1 are possible in a rational expectations equilibrium, depending upon the beliefs of shareholders.
I do not show the analysis here, but the cuto¤ c is unchanged letting ! > 0; i.e., c is not a function of !. This means that, as a percentage of expected …rm value, the requisite liquidation costs are a decreasing function of !. While requisite liquidation costs may seem improbably high in relation to just E[v] (in this example, c > E[v]) , they are much more realistic in comparison to E[! + v]. One interesting possibility is that if c i is an increasing function of !, then shareholders can always commit to not completely selling out by contributing more capital to the …rm. 6 . The fraud is publicly revealed, in the sense that is publicly realized, and the post-revelation stock price p 0 is publicly realized.
7. Liability l and transfers t, if any, are assessed and made.
Equilibrium
Stating this game formally, the manager chooses a report 0 to maximize shareholder payo¤s:
subject to the purchasers'break-even (individual rationality) constraint
where is the purchaser's updated Bayesian probability that the manager's private signal was H. If, in equilibrium, high and low value …rms disclose identically (a "pooling equilibrium"), the signal contains no information. In that case, purchasers learn nothing new from the disclosure, and so = Pr(H): On the other hand, if, in equilibrium, high …rms disclose H and low …rms disclose L (a "separating equilibrium"), purchasers are fully informed of …rms' underlying quality: With separation, = 1 if 0 = H; and = 0 if 0 = L: In order for a separating equilibrium to occur, it must be the case that the manager prefers to signal so as to reveal truthfully his information. This must be true both where the manager receives a high signal H (the high value …rm) and where the manager receives the low signal L (the low value …rm). Formally, these constraints are:
The …rst constraint, IC L ; is the incentive compatibility constraint for a lowvalue …rm, which requires that a low value …rm will not prefer to mimic a highvalue …rm (which receives the high-value …rm price, p H ). That is, expected payo¤s are higher given low quality (L) and a low signal (L 0 ) than given low quality and a high signal (H 0 ). The second constraint, IC H ; is the incentive compatibility constraint for a high value …rm, which requires that a high-value …rm will not prefer to mimic a low-value …rm. These constraints will be satis…ed or not depending upon, in particular, the adjudication function ; as described in Section 4:
Deviant corporate governance and vicarious liability
Here, I will state some general results concerning the e¤ectiveness of vicarious liability as a deterrent. The …rst is that incentives for securities fraud exist even where the manager perfectly represents the interests of shareholders, maximizing aggregated shareholder payo¤s:
Proposition 3 Deviant Corporate Governance: Absent liability, fraud is Pareto-optimal among the set of shareholders.
To see this, recall from Section 2.1.2 that the ex ante expected utility of the selling shareholder is U Si = p c i ; and that of the non-selling shareholder is
If there is no liability, l = 0, and
. From this, one can see that selling shareholders do better, and non-selling shareholders do no worse, where the price of the share p is higher. Thus, shareholders would choose to set p as high as possible, all else being equal. What this is saying is that shareholders are no di¤erent than the seller in any sort of commercial transaction, who prefers a higher price to a lower one. Given a manager who maximizes aggregate shareholder payo¤s, …rms will tend to commit fraud.
Note that this result is in accord with Arlen and Carney's (1992) emprical …nding that the vast majority of frauds involve price in ‡ation; the cause of this fraud is not, however, agency costs, as Arlen and Carney suggest.
Corollary 4 Absent liability, a pooling equilibirum is the only possible equilibrium.
What happens when there exists no liability? Shareholders prefer to disclose fraudulently, and both low and high …rms will disclose high. However, purchasers know that they can no longer attach any credibility to shareholder disclosures, and a pooling equilibrium results where the price that purchasers will pay is the prior-weighted expected value of the …rm:
While the instant model has nothing to say about e¢ ciency per se, pooling is likely to be ine¢ cient as it can result in adverse selection, suboptimal investment in projects, and supraoptimal investments in information.
The next proposition states that some level of vicarious liability can always serve to properly deter fraud:
Proposition 5 E¤ ectiveness of Vicarious Liability: If at least one shareholder does not sell ( < 1), then there exists some level of vicarious liability such that separation is an equilibrium outcome. This is apparent from an examination of the incentive compatibility constraints IC L and IC H . Rearranging and combining these contraints, in a separating equilibrium it must be the case that
For this to hold, it must be that p H p L 2 ( 1; 1), which means that there must be some bounds on p H and p L . Substituting in from the IR P constraint that
; this condition may be rewritten as:
This condition is easily met, in theory if not in practice, since the regulator can …x the fraud penalty at a high level and the non-fraud penalty at a low level (for instance, let
Thus, vicarious liability is a theoretically sound means of deterring securities fraud. 21 Of course, this does not tell us about whether a vicarious liability scheme, such as 10b-5, is implementable given what the court can observe. The example of setting fraud penalties to in…nity works if fraud is perfectly detectable, but probably not otherwise. Whether the speci…c 10b-5 remedy is implementable in a fashion that deters fraud is the focus of the next Section.
E¢ cacy of the 10b-5 remedy under limited veri…ability
As shown in Proposition 5, vicarious liability has the potential to create a separating equilibrium. Whether it can do so depends upon the particular liability rule used. Ultimately, any process for …nding liability will be limited by what the court can observe. So, for instance, if the court observes everything, including the manager's private knowledge, perfect enforcement is possible. But in the more plausible case that the court cannot observe everything, the court must work with what it has. I consider three particular classes of adjudication functions de…ned by what the court might or might not be able to observe. First, I consider adjudication functions where the court can observe only the transaction price p; the resulting share price p 0 ; and the proportion of shares sold . These are the most eminently feasible set of adjudication functions, since they require nothing more from the court than subtracting p 0 from p and assessing that, multiplied by the number of plainti¤s'shares, against the …rm. I
show that under strict liability (where …rms are always liable for declines), separation occurs, but that under partial strict liability (where fraud is discovered or liability assessed only part of the time), it never occurs. Similarly, separation will fail where damages are arbitrarily capped. I show, however, that separation may occur under partial strict liability where …rms incur litigation costs. I also show that where 10b-5 is replaced with a non-compensatory system of …nes, to reach a separating equilibrium requires that the court have access to much more information than under 10b-5.
Second, I consider the possibility that the court can also observe the …rm's signal 0 and the prior probabilities Pr[H], and also draw inferences about the reporting strategies that …rms follow (Bayesian updating). 22 Since strict liability ensures separation, it is unsurprising that separation can occur where the court has received additional information. I show, however, that making adjudications based upon a "preponderance of the evidence" (i.e., a more than 50% likelihood of fraud) results in only partial separation, where low …rms employ a mixed strategy of sometimes lying and sometimes not.
Third, I consider the possibility that the court can observe everything. Not surprisingly, this leads to perfect enforcement and perfect separation. In such a case, other liability regimes, such as in…nite penalties for fraud, would work just as well.
Minimal veri…ability: prices

Strict liability: = 1
One criticism of fraud on the market litigation has been that it amounts to a scheme of insurance, where …rms are made liable for insuring the price of their shares; this is generally thought to be bad (Co¤ee, 2005) . 23 While such a scheme of strict liability is counter, perhaps, to the scienter requirements of the law, it is easy to show that, whatever its other demerits, it still yields a separating equilibrium.
Proposition 6 E¤ ectiveness of Strict Liability: Even if courts can only observe prices, p and p 0 , separation is still attainable by letting = 1 for p 0 < p; = 0 otherwise.
To model the e¤ect of a price insurance scheme, let = 1 if p 0 < p ; and = 0 otherwise: i.e., the …rm is liable to purchasers whenever the share price declines. From (2) and (5), p 0 < p , v < p: If separation were to occur, the prices are calculated from the following form of the purchaser's break-even constraint: 2 2 Whether the court can observe the …rm's signal in a meaningful sense is questionable; translating a …rm's disclosure into a price or a ranking requires the court to undertake analysis of the …rm's fundamentals, a task for which the court is not generally quali…ed. 2 3 In Spindler 2007a, I note that strict liability in the IPO context destroys value as it prohibits the transfer of risk from risk-averse entrepreneur to risk-neutral investor. The IPO context is di¤erent than secondary trading, since the latter involves investors on both ends of the transaction, both of whom are diversi…ed and e¤ectively risk-neutral.
That is, purchasers are willing to pay the maximum of the …rm's potential cash ‡ows, , since under a fully compensatory regime, they would always get back whatever they pay. 24 One must then check to make sure that these prices satisfy the manager's incentive compatibility constraints. Starting with the low type's incentive compatibility constraint, IC L ;
which means that the low-type …rm will always weakly prefer to report its true type.
Turning to the high-type's incentive compatibility constraint, IC H ;
which is always true, meaning that the high-type …rm will always prefer to report its true type. Thus, a scheme of price insurance results in full separation. It is, in other words, an adequate deterrent to fraud. It is also fully compensatory: purchasers of shares, who would otherwise lose out due to the in ‡ated purchase price of the shares, are completely compensated by the liability and transfer scheme. On the other side of the coin, shareholders gain ex ante exactly zero from fraud: their expected gain from selling at a fraudulent price (E[ (p v)]) is exactly o¤set by the expected loss from fraud in the event that they do not sell (E[(1 ) ( 1 (p v)] ). Thus, the claim that 10b-5 liability merely shifts dollars from one pocket of the shareholder to the other (Booth 2005 , Economist 2006) is simply not correct; there is a divergence of interest between current shareholders and purchasers which makes some fraud deterrent necessary to allow separation to occur. For instance, if = 0, then both types of …rms would report H since there is no penalty for lying. A scheme of full price insurance perfectly remedies that divergence of interest.
It is worth noting that this is a readily implementable scheme of liability: a court simply assigns liability based on share price movements. Transaction costs would be very low, since if the burden of proof is simply to point to a share price drop, it seems reasonable to suppose that legal fees and court costs would be minimal. However, it is true that under strict liability, litigation is constantly occurring: here, even with separation, the probability that the realized cash ‡ows are less than the transaction price p H = H or p L = L is 1, since the …rm prices its shares at the upper limit of its potential cash ‡ows. This implies, perhaps, that a signi…cant volume of litigation is not necessarily indicative of a failed disclosure regime, which cuts against the merits literature's view that settlement absent indicia of fraud is evidence of 10b-5's broken-ness (Alexander 1991 What happens under a non-compensatory regime? It is worth asking at this point, what would happen if instead of using liability assessed against the …rm to compensate purchasers, the government simply kept the money or threw it away? In such a case, separation does not occur, because prices are depressed to the point where the low …rm does better disclosing high, as this allows the …rm's shareholders the ability to capture more of the potential upside of their …rm. Thus, deterrent and compensatory e¤ects are interrelated: removing the compensatory nature of the 10b-5 mechanism (i.e., letting t = 0, l = p p 0 ) under-deters fraud and results in pooling.
Suppose that liability is assessed in the same way, by subtracting ex post price from ex ante price and multiplying by the number of shares transacted: t = p p 0 ; l = t, except that purchasers'ex post payo¤ is now P P = v l p : That is, they do not receive the liability transfer t; instead, the government keeps it. In this counterfactual case, incidentally, the critics' claim would be correct that purchasers su¤er from liability assessed against the …rm.
Using the IR P constraint to …gure prices and substituting in with l = 1 (p v) from the above, we have
Note that the price is decreasing in , with a minimum of p = 0 when = 1 and lim
. Price will always be depressed below the expected value of the …rm's cash ‡ows.
In order to have a separating equilibrium, the incentive compatibility constraints of both the high and low …rms must be satis…ed. Starting with the low …rm:
By working through this inequality, we can see that the low …rm never chooses to report truthfully. In the case where p H > L, rearrangement and substitution of the inequality yields that the …rm reports truthfully
0; which can never be true since lim
In the case where p H < L, rearrangement yields that the low …rm will disclose truthfully only where p H + p L 2L; which can also never be true since p H > p L and by assumption p H < L. Thus, there is never separation where the government does not use the liability l to compensate purchasers. What this example shows, then, is that the compensatory function of 10b-5 is inextricably intertwined with the deterrent function. By taking the transfer t away from the purchaser, deterrence (in the form of a separating equilibrium) has been fouled up: the depressed ex ante purchase price means that the low …rm has more to gain, and less to lose, from falsely reporting than it did where the compensatory nature of 10b-5 a¤ected share prices ex ante.
Partial strict liability and damages caps
What happens when the enforcement mechanism operates as strict liability, but only sometimes? In other words, suppose that there is only some constant probability of being found liable given a price decline, which is less than one. We would expect the price to be lower, since purchasers will fail to be compensated as completely for their losses, and ex ante will be willing to pay less. Thus, arbitrarily limiting remedies under 10b-5 leads to under-deterrence and pooling.
The purchaser's IR P constraint again gives a quadratic term which we can solve to obtain p for the separating case.
The term k is always less than 1, which implies that p is always less than .
We then check to see if this p satis…es the IC L constraint.
There are two possible variants of this constraint that must be considered.
H=L
Since H=L > 1, this can never be true for the range of 2 (0; 1), since k 1 must always be less than 2. We can then check whether IC L is satis…ed where
Since p H ; p L < L; the above is true only if 1; which is a contradiction. Thus, if is a …xed constant that is less than 1, there is no separating equilibrium since the low value …rm always gains from reporting H.
This result is essentially the same as for a price cap on class action damages, a reform that has been proposed by some including Langevoort (1996) . Supposing that courts limit damages in some cases to a maximum amount, such that the purchaser enjoys full recovery for some level of cash ‡ows v > v such that l = l(v), but that damages are capped such that the liability assessment l = l( v) for any v < v: It is unsurprising that since strict liability perfectly internalizes fraud, any arbitrary departure therefrom will have distortive e¤ects upon …rm behavior.
Indeterminate liability One complication is whether the ex post share price p 0 is set before or after the adjudication function is determined. That is, if p 0 is determined when has been realized (liability will either be assessed or it won't), then the adjustment of the ex post price and the liability mechanism operate so as to make the purchaser whole. However, if p 0 is determined when there is only some expectation regarding , then p 0 = v E[ l]; and it follows that the purchaser's recovery will be lower than in the former case.
More speci…cally, if p 0 is determined with only the expectation of known, then (assuming that is not a function of v; ; p), the psost revelation trading price is
The purchaser's ex post payo¤s are then
We can write the IR P constraint under separation as:
This yields a price of p =k ; wherek ~ 1 (1 p 1 ~ ): This does not really change the results from the partial strict liability case described above, since simply translates into a somewhat smaller~ ; and a pooling equilibrium will result for any < 1. It does, however, mean that purchasers are not made quite whole, even when liability is assessed.
Partial strict liability with a litigation penalty or manager …nes
In reality, litigation is not costless. Firms are required to pay attorneys to defend them, managerial time and e¤ort is diverted, and plainti¤s' attorneys may take a sizeable chunk of any award or settlement that is assigned. Because of the large litigation costs that we observe in real life, some observers have questioned the compensatory function of the fraud on the market mechanism, as well as the ability of such a system to provide useful deterrence against fraud (e.g., Co¤ee 2007) . Indeed, it is apparent that where litigation costs are su¢ ciently large, …rms will do anything to avoid litigation, including disclosing a fraudulently low report (i.e., 0 (H) = L). But is a moderate level of litigation penalty always such a bad thing? As shown above in Section 2.1.5, foreseeable litigation costs borne by the …rm do not a¤ect the compensatory nature of the fraud on the market remedy. I show in this subsection that litigation penalties may support separation where it would not have otherwise existed. Additionally, in the complete contracting framework here, penalties imposed upon the manager are equivalent to penalties imposed upon the …rm because the …rm would always indemnify the manager. 25 Suppose that < 1 (a partial strict liability scheme which, as shown above, would not ordinarily result in separation), and that a per-share litigation penalty of " > 0 is incurred by the …rm when it is successfully sued. Since there is full recovery inclusive of the litigation costs borne by the …rm, this means that the purchaser's break-even constraint IR P is unchanged from the prior case, so that p = k; where k is de…ned as above: k
(1 p 1 ) : Since < 1 ) p < (as shown in eq. (7)),the low …rm's incentive compatibility constraint is:
If p H < L; this becomes:
Since p = k; these two conditions become
As there is a penalty being levied on disclosing a higher value, we need also to check the incentive compatibility constraint of the high-type …rm, since for a large enough ", …rms would prefer to disclose a lower value in order to avoid costly litigation. Turning to the high-type …rm's incentive compatibility constraint, IC H , knowing that under partial price insurance p H < H and p L < H:
So, for p H < L, we have that separation occurs where
and it is apparent (by adding 1 2 k(H +L) to both bounds) that a level of litigation penalty exists such that separation will occur: For p H > L; we have separation where
This second interval exists for all 2 (0; 1).
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This subsection demonstrates several things. First, the 10b-5 fraud on the market remedy is perfectly compensatory even taking into account litigation costs borne by the …rm; this does, however, except plainti¤s' attorneys' fees, which do a¤ect plainti¤ recoveries.
Second, even for a scheme of partial strict liability (i.e., 2 (0; 1)), there exists a range of litigation penalties that ensures separation; outside of this range ensures pooling. This means that litigation penalties borne by the …rm can actually be either helpful or hurtful in the securities class action context, since they can provide an extra deterrent to both fraudulently high and truthfully high reporting.
Third, note that, given the complete contracting framework in which this model takes place, a penalty levied on the manager would have the same e¤ect as a litigation penalty levied upon the …rm as a whole. That is, the …rm simply indemni…es the manager for any …nes incurred, as the …rm and manager negotiate back to their joint optimum. Thus, the e¤ect of instituting or increasing agent liability is simply to cause indemni…cation thereof, which has an identical e¤ect to other sorts of litigation costs: it can encourage separation in some cases where the increased …ne pushes the litigation costs into the range of " speci…ed above, but it can also lead to pooling when those …nes push " outside of those bounds.
Manager penalties only, no compensation Since a criticism of the 10b-5 remedy has been that managers are responsible for fraud and that therefore penalties should be levied upon managers rather than …rms, one might ask what would happen if we abandoned the 10b-5 remedy in favor of a schedule of managerial penalties only. With complete contracting, the manager will be indemni…ed for any …nes J N that he is required to pay, such that there is a cost to each share of J. Where there is no 10b-5 rule, litigation costs will in fact a¤ect purchaser recoveries, such that purchasers really are worse o¤ where the manager is …ned. Assuming = 1, the IR P constraint is:
Note that prices are depressed below the value of the cash ‡ows in this case, since the purchasers have a net negative expected payo¤ from the …ne J:
which is always true for 2 (0; 1).
Because of the complexity of the p formulation, it will be more instructive to temporarily normalize L to zero. The low …rm's incentive compatibility constraint IC L is
Plugging in for p H from eq(12), we get that IC H L is satis…ed only if
The high …rm's incentive compatibility constraint IC L H is
, J 1 H From eqs (13) and (14), separation will occur only if J 2
There are a few notable things about this outcome. First, purchasers are made worse o¤ ex post by the imposition of the manager …nes J. Second, prices p are depressed below the expected value of the …rm's cash ‡ows in order to satisfy the purchasers' ex ante break-even constraint. Third, even if the …ne J is allowed to be variable, courts (or whoever is administering the …ne) must have at their disposal quite a lot of information in order to ensure a separating equilibrium: the court must know L; H; and . (Note that, in comparison, the bounds of the separation-supporting " in (11) does not have as an argument.) 27 Post-revelation declines in price will not be informative: the decline in share price is p p 0 = 1 2 J+ v + J; which leaves the court with two unknowns and one equation, so conditioning the …ne J on the degree of price drop will not work. Either too high or too low a …ne causes the breakdown of the separating equilibrium, and it seems doubtful that a court or administrator with limited information could keep …nes within the necessary bounds.
Moderate veri…ability: prices, priors, and strategies
Likelihood ratio cuto¤ strategy
The adjudication functions so far (other than perfect enforcement) have assumed that courts or administrators know very little: only prices. One might suppose, however, that courts have (or can get) a little more information: if courts can formulate a prior of …rm quality and can observe the …rm's signal and cash ‡ows, then it is possible to draw some inference about whether it is more likely than not that fraud was committed. The court would set a cut-o¤ level v of cash ‡ows such that any cash ‡ow below v results in a determination of liability if the …rm reported H, while any result at or above v does not. To determine whether the …rm is liable, the court asks whether it is more likely than not that the report of H was false, i.e.,
Applying Bayes'Rule,
The court takes into account the low …rm's likelihood of lying: the low-type …rm reports H 0 fraction of the time, and L 0 fraction (1 ) of the time (i.e., Pr[H 0 jL] = ). To compute this value, …rst note that the numerator term Pr[H 0 \ vjL] is equal to the probability that a low …rm reports high times the probability that a low …rm that reports high generates a cash ‡ow of v:
The second equality results from the fact that the reporting strategy of the …rm does not a¤ect cash ‡ows v:
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The denominator term Pr[H 0 \ v] is equal to the probability of a high report times the probability of cash ‡ow v : Pr[H 0 ] Pr [v] . One can calculate Pr[H 0 ] since we know that low …rms lie with probability and high …rms always tell the truth:
The likelihood of cash ‡ows v is
Putting this all together, the probability that the high reporting …rm is actually a low-type …rm given cash ‡ow v is then
Note that v is not an argument of the probability function, except for whether v is greater or less than L; if v > L, the …rm must have been a high type …rm and the probability of fraud is zero. This means that the cuto¤ v at which the court determines liability must be either L or zero. Suppose …rst that the cuto¤ is zero: in such a case, the low …rm always lies since there is never any liability for doing so; = 1 and
That is, if the probability of a the …rm being of high type is su¢ ciently large, then it is always more likely than not that the …rm reporting high is, in fact, of high type. In that case, v = 0 and = 1 in a pooling equilibrium.
Suppose, however, that Pr[H] < H H+L . If the court used v = 0 as its cuto¤, low …rms would always lie, and the probability of fraud given a high report and v < L would be greater than 1/2. Thus, v = 0 is not an equilibrium and the court's cuto¤ strategy would have to be v = L ; which amounts to a regime of strict liability for low-type …rms and which (as we have seen above) makes low-type …rms indi¤erent to lying. In such a case, low …rms can play a mixed strategy, meaning that , the probability of lying, takes on any value such that Pr[Ljv \ H 0 ] > 1=2. What does this result tell us? First of all, the 10b-5 remedy works to sustain a mixed separating equilibrium in a setting where courts are Bayesian updaters. Second, even where a court has available to it more information, cash ‡ows and price declines are still important evidence in determining whether or not fraud has been committed. 29 This means that correlation between price declines and lawsuits is to be expected under a well-functioning anti-fraud rule; it is not necessarily evidence of "meritless" litigation. Third, where a court employs a preponderance of the evidence standard, there will still be some incidence of fraud and litigation, perhaps signi…cantly so depending upon the parameter values of the model. This happens because the court, which is a Bayesian updater, will never assess liability where …rms play strict separating strategies, which leads low …rms to lie. One could always reduce the degree of fraud by decreasing the evidentiary burden required to establish guilt, if one wished. In any event, a fairly high incidence of litigation is not necessarily a symptom of a broken anti-fraud regime.
Full veri…ability: perfect enforcement
Suppose that courts are able to verify the manager's private signal and that the rule is to impose liability whenever a low type …rm claims to be of high type. If that is the case, then IR P yields separated prices of p H = H=2 and p L = L=2, since, if everyone tells the truth, there is never any successful litigation; thus, a purchaser's payo¤ is just the expected cash ‡ows of the …rm, E[v] = =2.
Since the high-type …rm never faces any penalty if it reports high, but enjoys a higher price for doing so, the high-type …rm never lies.
If the low type …rm discloses truthfully, it is never liable. Any time that the low type …rm reports falsely, it faces = 1 in the event that cash ‡ows fall short of p H . 
Conclusions and future research
The model I present in this paper questions much of the common wisdom regarding the causes of corporate fraud, the role of vicarious liability, and the e¢ cacy of 10b-5 class actions. I show that fraud may arise from shareholder incentives, since shareholders are, in aggregate, sellers of the …rm's shares and thus may prefer corporate governance that tends to in ‡ate the …rm's price. For this brand of fraud, I show that vicarious liability is a proper form of deterrence mechanism. In particular, I show that 10b-5 functions well in terms of both deterrence and compensation, and requires very little in terms of veri…ability (i.e., what the court can observe) in order to operate. In contrast, the proposed substitutes -damages caps, SEC-administered …nes, disallowing investor recovery, and manager penalties -may perform worse and often require that the court/regulator has much more information at its disposal. This model is therefore a direct challenge to the extant criticisms of 10b-5 and to the commonly heard proposals for its replacement.
There are several directions along which one may expand this analysis. It remains to be shown how 10b-5 functions when managerial moral hazard and limited contracting are included; for instance, where the manager's compensation contract consists of an equity stake. Additionally, the model could easily accommodate unobservable managerial e¤ort, and this would be one way, perhaps, to highlight e¢ ciency losses from overbearing liability placed upon the manager.
But, in any event, the implications of the simple model presented here are clear and noteworthy. 10b-5 does not appear to be as bad, at least at …rst blush, as everyone says it is. Several alternatives to 10b-5 appear to be markedly worse. More analysis is required, but the framework of this model provides a useful starting point.
to equal the number of buyers, and purchasing shareholders are only a subset of all purchasers. Thus, this is a weighted average of payo¤s. Letting~ which is equivalent to a manager's maximization problem where shareholders may only sell or hold.
